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Abstract
This paper incorporates two features of housing in a life-cycle analysis of social secu-
rity: housing as a durable good and housing market frictions. We nd that with housing
as a durable good unfunded social security substantially crowds out housing consump-
tion throughout the life cycle. By contrast, aggregate non-durable consumption is higher
when social security is present, although it is postponed until late in life. Moreover, in the
presence of housing market frictions, social security lowers the aggregate home ownership
rate and reduces the average size of owner-occupied housing. The e¤ects of social security
on housing position, furthermore, exhibit substantial heterogeneity across households of
di¤erent income levels.
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1 Introduction
For most U.S. households, both housing and social security play key roles in their consump-
tion and saving behavior over the life cycle. The durable feature of housing distinguishes
housing services from non-durables by linking the cost of housing services to nancial asset
returns. Housing, moreover, constitutes the largest share in most homeownerstotal assets
and closely interacts with householdsliabilities.1 Social security, by contrast, discourages
household savings and redistributes resources from ones working years to retirement. The
distinctive features of housing and social security reopen the question of how social secu-
rity, as mandatory savings for future retirement, crowds out private assets and, particularly,
owner-occupied housing.
This paper incorporates housing and housing tenure decision into a life-cycle analysis of
social security. Our analysis shows that unfunded social security substantially reduces hous-
ing consumption, both at the aggregate level and over the life cycle. Conversely, aggregate
non-durable consumption is higher when social security is present, although it is postponed
until late in life.2 Social security, moreover, lowers the aggregate home-ownership rate and
reduces the average size of owner-occupied housing. The e¤ects of social security on housing
position, furthermore, exhibit substantial heterogeneity across households of di¤erent income
levels.
Our economy is a general equilibrium life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents that
are subject to both idiosyncratic labor-income risks and uncertain lifetimes. Two features
of housing are incorporated: First, housing services are explicitly valued by households, and
housing is a durable good. Under a no-arbitrage condition between housing and nancial
assets, this feature builds a positive link between the cost of housing services in terms of non-
durables and the interest rate. As a result, housing consumption is essentially a current
consumption good relative to non-durables.
Second, housing markets are frictional. In particular, our model incorporates three types
of housing market frictions that leads to a nontrivial housing tenure decision. The rst
market friction is rental-market friction, captured by the assumption that rental housing
depreciates at a faster rate than owner-occupied housing.3 The presence of rental-market
frictions drives a wedge between the housing rental price and the user cost of housing.
1According to Bucks, Kennickell and Moore (2006), on average, primary residence accounts for 32.3 percent
of total household assets, and home-secured debt accounts for 75:2 percent of total liabilities in the 2004 Survey
of Consumer Finance. Moreover, the proportion of families with home-secured debt amounted to 47:9 percent
in 2004.
2Non-durable consumption in this paper corresponds to expenditures on non-durable goods, market ser-
vices, service ows from consumer durables, and government consumption.
3This assumption also captures in a very reduced form the (non-modeled) preferential tax treatments of
owning a housing versus renting.
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Accordingly, home ownership is a desirable choice for housing consumption. The second
market friction is down-payment constraint. Under this friction, housing tenure choice is
contingent on households disposable income. This, in turn, constrains home ownership,
especially for those with binding borrowing constraints. The third market friction is housing
transaction cost. With housing transaction costs, households prefer to own a house in which
the expected tenure is su¢ ciently long. This friction, again, tends to reduce home-ownership
rates, given the hump shape of housing consumption over the life cycle.
We calibrate the economy to the U.S. data. Our calibrated economy can well capture
housing tenure choices of U.S. households along several dimensions, such as home-ownership
rates over the life cycle and the share of owner-occupied housing in householdsnet worth.
This renders our model a useful benchmark to explore the impacts of social security reforms
on consumption, housing tenure choice and portfolio allocation.
We then study the steady-state impact of elimination of social security.4 Our major
ndings can be summarized as follows:
 The impacts of eliminating social security on the two types of consumption are drasti-
cally di¤erent. Specically, this reform increases aggregate housing consumption by 47
percent, while reducing aggregate non-durable consumption by two percent. Housing
consumption is crowded out by social security throughout most of the life cycle and,
especially, during working years. On the other hand, the presence of social security
merely postpones non-durable consumption until late in life. Accordingly, the propor-
tional increase in housing stock is about 13-percent higher than physical capital (36.2
percent versus 23.2 percent) at the aggregate level when social security is eliminated.
The above result originates from the feature of housing as a durable good.5 In our
model, the presence of social security pushes up the price of housing services in terms of
non-durable good since it discourages savings in nancial assets and, thus, raises the interest
rate. As a consequence, households tend to substitute non-durable consumption for housing
consumption throughout the life cycle. Eliminating social security, conversely, reduces the
price of housing consumption, which shows up as both a lower rental price and a lower
cost of debt nancing or opportunity cost of home equity for homeowners. Accordingly, a
lower price of currentconsumption leads not only to a substitution of current consumption
for future consumption, but also to a substitution of housing consumption for non-durable
consumption throughout the life cycle. We show that in a partial equilibrium context, all
4A detailed exploration of the transitional path of eliminating social security in our settings is desirable.
However, due to the computational burden it involves, we leave this interesting issue for future research.
5As a result, this result holds even in an environment without housing market frictions, as we show in
Section 2.
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these asymmetric impacts of social security on di¤erent types of consumption and capital
are missing.
 Eliminating social security increases housing position at the aggregate level. In partic-
ular, this policy reform raises the average home-ownership rate by ve percent, mostly
around middle age. The average size of owner-occupied housing, moreover, is boosted
by 33.0 percent.
 In terms of householdsportfolio allocation, the proportional increase in owner-occupied
housing is signicantly larger than that of nancial assets when social security is elim-
inated. Most of the increase in owner-occupied housing, moreover, happens during
middle age. By contrast, the crowding-out e¤ect of social security on nancial assets
is mostly around retirement age.
 The e¤ects of social security on housing position exhibit substantial heterogeneity
across households of di¤erent income levels. When social security is abolished, home-
ownership rates rise among poor households and fall among the rich. On the other
hand, the average size of housing increases among the rich, while shrinking for the
poor.
Two key channels in our model underlie the above e¤ects of social security on housing
position. First, the payroll taxation of social security reduces householdsdisposable income.
Given the presence of down-payment constraints, this forces many households to be renters,
despite the fact that services of owner-occupied housing are cheaper. Accordingly, eliminat-
ing payroll taxation encourages home ownership, due to a relaxation of borrowing constraints.
On the other hand, this channel pushes down the average size of owner-occupied housing,
as new homeowners in the regime without social security tend to purchase smaller housing
than those who would choose to be homeowners in both regimes. The second channel is
through the e¤ects of social security on the price of housing consumption. In the presence of
rental-market frictions, this implies a large crowding-out of social security on owner-occupied
housing. This is because, for homeowners, lower housing consumption is linked to smaller
owner-occupied housing. Accordingly, eliminating social security raises the desired size of
owner-occupied housing, especially at ages when the home-ownership rate is high. A desired
larger house, however, encourages households to postpone home purchase under both hous-
ing transaction costs and down-payment constraints, so that they may accumulate enough
nancial assets to meet the down-payment requirement. Therefore, when housing market
frictions are present, the second channel pushes down home-ownership rates.
The e¤ects of social security on housing position for households of di¤erent income levels
depend on which of the above two channels dominates for each individual. For poor house-
holds, the rst channel dominates because elimination of the payroll tax has a larger impact
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on their disposable income. As a result, home-ownership rates increase signicantly among
the poor, with new homeowners buying smaller housing than those who would be homeown-
ers in both regimes. For the rich, the second channel dominates, as they are less subject to
borrowing constraints. Hence, home-ownership rates drop among the rich, while the average
size of owner-occupied housing increases signicantly when social security is abolished.
The mechanisms described in this paper for social security to a¤ect housing consump-
tion and housing tenure choice are consistent with the following empirical ndings. Using
household survey data, Ruprah and Marcano (2007) study the experience of Chilean hous-
ing a¤ordability following Chiles privatization of social security system in 1981.6 They nd
that, in 1990, 84 percent of households were unable to a¤ord a house of market conditions,
while by 2003, this statistics had fallen to 61 percent. Two thirds of this improvement in af-
fordability, moreover, was due to the reduction in mortgage interest rates for a given change
in the price of a house. Furthermore, their results indicate that the deepening of mortgage
markets is driven mainly by an increase in savings by private pension funds.7 Concern-
ing housing tenure choice, Castles (1998) explores the relationship between rates of home
ownership and various indices of public welfare in 20 OECD countries. His results show a
signicant cross-country negative correlation between the home-ownership rate and the size
of public pension expenditures. Similarly, with panel regression, Conley and Gi¤ord (2006)
nd that countries with a higher total social security benet expenditures as a percentage
of GDP have lower home-ownership rates.
This paper builds upon the literature on the life-cycle portfolio choice with housing. For
example, Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) develop a model of durable consumption
with collateral borrowing to explore the life-cycle patterns of consumption and saving. In
their model, however, housing rental markets are shut down by assumption.8 Our modeling
strategy is close in spirit to Yao and Zhang (2005) and Li and Yao (2007). As in this
paper, both papers incorporate housing tenure choice and the three types of housing market
frictions. Their focus, nevertheless, is the life-cycle e¤ects of housing-price risks on housing
position and portfolio allocation.9
Moreover, our ndings add to the extensive discussion on the desirability of social secu-
6 In 1981, a new pension system was introduced in Chile to replace the pay-as-you-go system. The new
system is based on personal capitalized accounts that are administered by private institutions.
7Their regression results indicate that an increase in the pension-fund balance of one percent of GDP
results in an increase of 0.25 percent in mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio.
8Yang (2008) extends the framework of Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) to allow for housing
tenure choice under frictionless rental markets.
9Other papers in this literature include Cocco (2005), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Sinai and Souleles
(2005), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) and Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2007).
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rity.10 This literature typically treats housing consumption and other consumption as perfect
substitutes, rather than treating housing as a durable good.11 Moreover, studies in this lit-
erature have abstracted from housing tenure choice, an important margin over households
life cycle. One contribution of our paper is to highlight the feature of housing consumption
as current consumption relative to non-durables, under which unfunded social security
inevitably substitutes nondurable consumption for housing consumption throughout the life
cycle.
Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on the role of housing for a variety of
macroeconomic issues. For example, Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and Gruber and Martin
(2003) explore the role of housing for wealth distribution in the U.S. Among the business-
cycle studies, Davis and Heathcote (2005) explain both the volatility of residential investment
and the co-movement of residential investment with other macro variables observed in the
data. Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2007) and Ríos-Rull and Sánchez-Marcos (2008),
moreover, study the dynamics of housing prices in response to various shocks. Nonetheless,
few studies have been conducted to explore the implications of housing and housing tenure
decision for various scal policies.12 To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to explore social
security in a model with housing and housing tenure choice.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct an economy with rental
housing, calibrate it to the U.S. economy and explore the e¤ects of eliminating social security
on consumption allocations. Section 3 performs a similar exercise in a economy with housing
market frictions, which we use to explore the implications of eliminating social security for
housing tenure decision and portfolio allocation. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains
a denition of competitive equilibrium, the details of calibration, the computational details,
and a welfare comparison.
2 An Economy with Rental Housing
In this section, we construct a model to explore the role of housing as a durable good.
To this end, the economy abstracts from housing tenure choices and is referred to as the
benchmark economy. A full-blown model with both housing as a durable good and housing
tenure choice will be provided in the following section.
10Contributors to this literature include, among others, Feldstein (1985), Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987),
Hubbard and Judd (1987), ·Imrohoro¼glu, ·Imrohoro¼glu and Joines (1995), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Conesa
and Krueger (1999), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999), Krueger and Kubler (2003) and Pries (2007).
11One main motivation for Hubbard and Judd (1987) to explore the interaction of payroll tax and borrowing
restrictions is the observed collateral requirements. In their model, however, housing is not explicitly modeled.
12See Gervais (2002) on the roles of the preferential tax treatment of housing capital and Jeske and Krueger
(2004) on the role of implicit guarantee for Government Sponsored Enterprises.
5
We consider a discrete-time dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle economy with both
idiosyncratic income and lifetime uncertainty. Compared to a standard life-cycle economy,
the model departs in two dimensions: Housing services are explicitly valued by households,
and housing is a durable good. Rent is the only option to obtain housing services. Behind
the abstraction of housing tenure choice are the following two implicit assumptions: First,
rental markets are frictionless; second, all households are shut down from borrowing. Under
these two assumptions, all households would prefer renting.
The setup of this economy serves two purposes: First, we would like to compare the
e¤ects of social security in this simple economy with those in a standard one-asset economy
(sketched at the end of this section) to highlight the roles of housing as a durable good.
Second, e¤ects of social security in this economy serve as a benchmark to be compared later
with their counterparts in a more realistic economy, with both housing as a durable good
and housing market frictions.
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 Demographics
Assume that the demographic structure is stationary. In each period, the economy is inhab-
ited by a continuum of ex ante identical individuals, with a constant population growth rate
n. Each individual can live for a maximum of J periods, working only for the rst jr   1
periods; the retirement age jr is exogenous. For each j = 1; :::; J   1, denote  j 2 (0; 1) as
the probability of surviving onto age j+1 conditional on living at age j. Clearly,  0 = 1 and
 J = 0: The probability of surviving through age s is then 
s
j=1 j . Denote

j
	J
j=1
as the
fraction of individuals of age j in the whole population. Clearly, the fraction of newborns is
1 =
0@1 + J 1X
j=1
(1 + n) j ji=1 i
1A 1 and the fraction of individuals for age j = 2; :::; J   1
can be computed recursively by j+1 = (1 + n)
 1  jj .
Private annuity markets are assumed to be missing. In addition, accidental bequests are
collected by the government and distributed uniformly as lump-sum transfers to all agents
alive next period, after production takes place.
2.1.2 Production Technologies
Aggregate output of non-durable goods, denoted as Y; is produced using physical capital
and labor input according to the production function Y = ZF (K;N). K is the quantity of
aggregate physical capital; N is aggregate e¢ cient labor input. Z is the level of total factor
productivity (TFP), which grows at a constant rate g. We assume that F is strictly increasing
in both arguments and strictly concave. Furthermore, F satises the Inada conditions and
is homogeneous of degree one. Without loss of generality, we assume that, in this economy,
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there is a representative rm that hires labor and physical capital from households to produce
non-durable goods in each period. The output can be either consumed or invested in physical
capital or housing on a one-to-one basis. We normalize the price of non-durable goods to one.
Denote Xk as aggregate investment in physical capital, which by assumption, depreciates at
a rate k. The law of motion for physical capital can be written as
K 0 =

1  k

K +Xk
where the superscript prime in this paper refers to end-of-period variables.
Housing stock depreciates at the beginning of each period at a rate h:
2.1.3 Preferences and Endowments
Households enter into the economy with no assets and are endowed with one unit of time in
each period. Individuals of di¤erent ages di¤er in their labor productivity. Denote fjgJj=1 as
the deterministic age prole of average labor productivity. In addition, workers of the same
age face idiosyncratic shocks to their labor productivity. The stochastic process of labor
productivity is assumed to be identical across individual workers and follows a nite-state
Markov process  (0 p ) with the state space  2 E = 1;:::; N	. Assume that  has a
unique stationary distribution, denoted by :
Households derive utility from both non-durable goods and housing service ows. Leisure
is not valued, and in each period labor supply is inelastic. The lifetime utility function can
then be written as
E
8<:
JX
j=1
jsj=1 ju (cj ; hj)
9=;
where  is the utility discount factor. c and h are non-durable and housing consumption,
respectively. The period utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing in both
arguments, strictly concave and obeys the Inada conditions. Without loss of generality, we
assume that one unit of housing capital generates one unit of housing service ow, regardless
of whether it is owned or rented.
2.1.4 Social Security System
The social security system in the initial steady state is a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGhence-
forth) system. In each period, the government levies a payroll tax on current workers and
distributes the tax revenue uniformly across the current retirees. In the interest of compu-
tational tractability, we assume that the level of social security benets received by a retiree
is independent of her history of social security contributions. A more realistic assumption is
that the level of social security benets is a concave function of the accumulated contribution
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over the working years (see Storesletten et al., 1999). However, under this assumption, the
state variable will increase by one dimension, which will tremendously raise the computa-
tional costs. Our specication of the unfunded social security system implies an upper bound
for the degree of intra-generational redistribution inherent in it.13
2.1.5 Market Arrangements
Households can save in one risk-free nancial asset a. To highlight the roles of housing,
we assume that no borrowing is allowed. This assumption is typically made in the social
security literature for standard life-cycle economies and will also be followed for the one-
asset economy constructed later in this section. We assume that in each period there exist
two-period-lived nancial intermediaries that pool individual householdsdeposit of nancial
assets. A nancial intermediary can use deposit for two purposes: to purchase housing for
renting out to individual renters at the end of the current period, and to purchase physical
capital to supply to the representative rm in the next period. In the next period, after
production of non-durable goods takes place, nancial intermediaries sell o¤ stocks of both
housing and physical capital and pay back the principal and interest to households. The
market for nancial intermediaries is competitive.
2.1.6 Timing and Information
In each period, the events proceed as follows. At the beginning of each period, the idio-
syncratic component of labor productivity is realized. Then, the housing tenure choice is
made. Next, agents supply labor to the representative rm, which also rents physical capital
for non-durable-good production. Agents then receive factor payments and transfers from
the government and decide how much to consume and save in nancial assets. Meanwhile,
the good market opens. Next, the housing-rental market opens. Renters pay rent to the
nancial intermediary in return for rental housing services. Finally, uncertainty about early
death is revealed. All information is publicly observed. The idiosyncratic labor productivity
becomes common knowledge once realized.
2.1.7 The households recursive problem
In a stationary equilibrium, the interest rate is constant at r and the wage rate w grows at a
rate g: The households state variables are given by (a; ; j), which denote the beginning-of-
period nancial asset, the stochastic component of labor productivity, and age, respectively.
13A larger intra-generational redistribution discourages poor households from saving in nancial assets,
which tends to drive up the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth. However, as we discuss below, our results regarding
the e¤ects of social security on di¤erent types of consumption are robust to our specication of benet formula.
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The problem for the household can be written as
V (a; ; j) = max
c;;a0;s
8<:u (c; d) +  jX
0

 
0 p 

V
 
a0; 0; j + 1
9=; (1)
s:t:
c+ pd+ a0 = (1 + r)a+ w (1  ) j + I (j) b+ Tr
c; a0  0
where d is service ows generated by rental housing, and Tr is the lump-sum transfer from
the government. b is social security benet per retiree. I(j) is an indicator function such
that
I(j) =
(
0 if 1  j  jr   1
1 if jr  j  J
2.1.8 The Financial Intermediarys Problem
In each period, a nancial intermediary takes in deposit A0: He then uses the fund to buy
capital K 0 and rental housing. Since the rental payment is made at the end of each period,
the cost of purchasing H 0 units of housing is H 0 (1  p) : In the next period, the nancial
intermediary collects the return on capital K 0 (1 + r0) and the net-of-depreciation rental
housing H 0
 
1  h and pays back the deposit with interest A0 (1 + r0).14
The budget constraint for a nancial intermediary is
A0  H 0 (1  p) +K 0 (2)
where A0 is the net deposit of nancial assets by households, and H 0 is the aggregate stock
of end-of-period housing for rental purposes.
The prot-maximizing problem for a nancial intermediary is
max
A0;Hr0;K0
 = H 0

1  h

 A0  1 + r0+K 0  1 + r0 (3)
subject to (2) :
Since the nancial market is competitive, each nancial intermediary earns zero prot in
equilibrium. Plugging (2) into (3) and using the zero-prot condition, we get the equilibrium
rental price for housing.
p =
r0 + h
1 + r0
(4)
Equation (4) shows that an increase in the return to nancial assets will push up the
price of housing consumption. Such a positive linkage between the price of housing and
14Alternatively, we may assume that rental housing accumulated today delivers housing services tomorrow.
This implies a rental price for housing p = r0 + h: Our results are robust to di¤erent timing specications.
9
interest rates makes housing services essentially a current consumption good relative to
non-durables. Clearly, what is behind this positive linkage is the feature of housing as a
durable good.
2.1.9 One-Asset Economy
To better understand the role of housing as a durable good, we construct a standard life-cycle
economy close to that in Conesa and Krueger (2002).15
In this economy, all households consume a single non-durable good, and save in one
risk-free liquid asset. There is a single production sector that rents capital and labor from
households to produce the single consumption good. Moreover, we assume that the borrowing
market is closed. We call this economy a one-asset economy.Alternatively, this economy
could be interpreted as one in which housing services perfectly substitute for other types of
consumption, and housing is part of the stock of productive capital.
2.2 Calibration and Computation
In this section, we rst describe our calibration procedure. We then discuss our solution
methods for the stationary equilibrium. After that, we explore how the benchmark model
performs in matching the relevant U.S. data.
2.2.1 Demographics
One period in our model corresponds to one year of calendar time. The maximum number
of periods that an agent is alive J = 66 and households retire at period jr = 46: This maps
into an economy in which individuals enter the labor force at age 20 and retire at age 65,
with the maximum age 85. The survival probabilities f ig66i=1 are taken from Bell and Miller
(2005). Finally, the population growth rate n is set to be 0.01, a number in line with the
U.S. long-run average.
2.2.2 Technology
We need to construct measures of output, capital, the stock of housing and their investment
counterparts (Y;K;H;Xk; Xh). We use data from the 2003 revision of National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed Asset Tables (FAT) of Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) for the years 1954-2000. Physical capital K is measured as the sum of private xed
assets, consumer durables, inventory stock and net foreign assets, minus the stock of private
residential structures. We exclude government capital from the denition of capital stock, as
our interest is in the private sector. We measure housing H as the stock of private residential
15The only di¤erence between our one-asset economy and that in Conesa and Krueger (2002) is that in our
model, leisure is not valued by households, while it is in theirs.
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structures. Output Y corresponds to GNP plus service ows from consumer durables, minus
service ows from housing, which, in NIPA, is imputed as the rental value of both tenant-
occupied and owner-occupied dwelling units.16 The denitions of Xk and Xh correspond to
the denition of K and H:
The production function for non-durable good takes the Cobb-Douglas form Y = ZKN1 :
We then calibrate  so that the share of capital income in output Y matches the correspond-
ing U.S. data (see Appendix 5.2 for details). This gives  = 0:2732. Note that this number
is di¤erent from the value used in the standard growth models since our measure of physical
capital and the output it produces excludes housing and housing services, respectively. The
productivity growth rate g = 0:015, which is consistent with the long-run average growth
rate of U.S. real GNP per capita.17
We set the annual depreciation rates for physical capital to match an average investment-
capital ratio, XkK , of 0.1201. The corresponding value of 
k is 0.0951. We compute the depre-
ciation rate for housing to match an average investment-capital ratio for private residential
structures, which is 0.0455. This gives h = 0:0205:
2.2.3 Endowments
The deterministic age proles of labor productivity fjgJj=1 are taken from Hansen (1993).
For retirees, j = 0:We follow Huggett (1996) in parameterizing the idiosyncratic component
of the labor-income process. Huggett (1996) uses the following AR(1) process for the log of
labor income process:
log j+1 =  log j + "j+1
where "  N (0; 2") and log 1  N (0; 21): Following Huggett (1996), the auto-regressive
coe¢ cient  and variance of innovation 2" are set to be 0.96 and 0.045, respectively. The
variance of labor-income shocks at initial age 21 = 0:38. Using the method proposed by
Tauchen (1986), we approximate the continuous AR(1) process with a seven-state Markov
chain. This results in a value of Gini coe¢ cient for labor income of 0.40, which is broadly
consistent with the U.S. data (0.49, see Díaz and Luengo-Prado, 2008).18 Table 1a reports
the values of  in the seven states, together with the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain.
16Accordingly, aggregate consumption, C; in our model corresponds to the sum of non-durables, services,
and imputed service ows from consumer durables minus the service ows from housing.
17A positive growth for TFP tilts up householdslife-cycle earning prole and, thus, tends to make their
borrowing constraints more binding when young, compared with the case with no secular growth. Our main
ndings, however, are not sensitive to the value of g.
18Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) compute the Gini coe¢ cient for earnings using data from the 1998 Survey
of Consumer Finance. Using data from CPS, PSID and CEX, Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2009, Figure
16) obtain a value of around 0.40 for Gini coe¢ cient for equivalent household earnings in 1998.
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Table 1a: Parameter Values for the Markov Chain
V alue 
1 0:1838 0:0637
2 0:2948 0:1283
3 0:4728 0:1955
4 0:7583 0:2250
5 1:2163 0:1955
6 1:9509 0:1283
7 3:1290 0:0637
2.2.4 Preference
We parameterize the period utility function with the standard isoelastic specication.
u (c; d) =
h
(c + (1  ) d) 1
i1    1
1  
Here, 11  stands for the elasticity of substitution between housing services and non-durable
consumption. The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  is set to 2, which is standard in macro-
economic literature. We set  = 0 following Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005).19
This implies a unit elasticity of substitution between the two types of consumption. We
then calibrate the utility discount factor  and the share of the non-durable consumption
in the utility function  so that both the ratio KY and the ratio
H
Y are consistent with the
U.S. data. We choose these two ratios as our targets because, as we will show later, the
e¤ects of social security on the two types of consumption and portfolio allocations depend
critically on the composition of aggregate wealth. According to our measures, the average KY
and HY between 1954 and 2000 are 1.682 and 1.043, respectively: This gives  = 0:9585 and
 = 0:895.20 Our calibration implies an interest rate r = 
Y
K
  k = 0:0673 at the initial
steady state.
2.2.5 Social Security
In the initial steady state, we choose the replacement rate # so that the payroll tax rate
matches it empirical counterpart. Currently, the OASI (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance)
rate is 10.7 percent.21 This implies # = 0:483.
19Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) cite several empirical studies to argue that the hypothesis  = 0
cannot be rejected at the ve-percent level.
20Since both types of consumption grow at a rate g at the steady state, the reported value of calibrated 
is inated by the growth component 1 + g.
21Social Security payroll-tax rate in the U.S. is 15.3 percent. Since we focus on retirement benets, we
subtract the part of the tax rate due to Medicare and Disability Insurance.
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Table 1b summarizes the calibrated parameters.
Table 1b: Parameter Values for the Benchmark Economy
Symbol Denition Value
Demographics
J Maximum age 66
jr Retirement age 46
 i Survival probabilities Bell et al. (2005)
n Population growth rate 0.01
Technology
 Capital share in non-durable good production function 0.2732
g TFP growth rate 0.015
k Depreciation rate for physical capital 0.0951
h Depreciation rate for housing 0.0205
Endowment
j Deterministic productivity of agents in age j Hansen (1993)
2" Variance of innovation to idiosyncratic shock 0.045
21 Variance of income distribution at initial age 0.38
 Autocorrelation coe¢ cient in stochastic earning process 0.96
Preference
 Discount factor in utility function 0:9585
 Share of non-durable consumption in utility function 0.895
 Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2
 Parameter governing elasticity of substitution in utility 0
Market Arrangement
a Lower bound for asset 0
2.2.6 One-Asset economy
For the one-asset economy, we adopt the same parameterization as the benchmark economy in
terms of demographic features, endowment process, and the social security replacement rate.
The capital K in this economy is dened as the sum of the private xed assets, consumer
durables, inventory stock and the net foreign assets. Accordingly, aggregate output, Y;
corresponds to GNP plus service ows from consumer durables, and aggregate consumption,
C; corresponds to the sum of non-durable goods, services, and service ows from a durable
good.
The capital share in the nal goods production, ; is chosen to 0.36, the average capital
income share between 1954 and 2000. The period utility function is u (c) = c
1  1
1  : The
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , is again set to 2 to be consistent with the benchmark
economy. The depreciation rate for the capital stock, ; is set to 0.0651 to match the
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investment-capital ratio in the U.S. data. According to NIPA, the average value of this
ratio is 0.0902 between 1954 and 2000. We calibrate the utility discount factor  so that
the capital-output ratio matches the wealth-income ratio in the U.S., which is 3.1. This
gives  = 0:9852: Finally, the absence of borrowing opportunities implies a = 0. Table 1c
summarizes the parameter values specic to this economy.
Table 1c: Parameter Values for the One-Asset Economy
Symbol Denition Value
 Capital share in output production function 0:360
 Depreciation rate for capital 0:0651
 Discount factor in utility function 0:9852
2.2.7 Solution Methods
Since analytical solutions for this problem do not exist, we solve for the stationary equilibria
of both economies by numerical methods. It is easy to show that a balanced growth path
exists in this economy. On the balanced growth path, all aggregate variables grow at a
constant rate (1 + g) (1 + n) : We detrend all aggregate variables so that the transformed
variables are constant at the steady state.
We discretize the asset space and, for each grid point of end-of-period housing assets,
use the Golden Section Search method to nd the optimal level of end-of-period nancial
assets, which may not necessarily lie on the grid points.22 Then, we nd the optimal level
of end-of-period housing assets by grid search.
In the tradition of computing general equilibrium overlapping-generations models, we
solve for the householdsproblem by backwards induction. Appendix 5.3 summarizes the
algorithm and the computational details.
2.2.8 General Features
To begin with, Table 2 reports some properties of the benchmark economy to compare
with the U.S. data. The upper panel lists variables that are targeted by our calibration,
while the bottom panel corresponds to non-targeted variables. Based on our calibration,
the values for capital-output ratio K=Y and the value of aggregate housing-output ratio
H=Y are consistent with the U.S. data. The Gini coe¢ cient generated by our model is
0.73, which is in line with the U.S. data, 0.80 (see Budria et. al, 2002, Table 1). Our
results shows that the large Gini coe¢ cient generated by our model could be due to a larger
fraction of agents in our model with zero wealth (22.0 percent) compared with the actual
data (17.6 percent, see Wol¤, 2004, Table 1). Several potential factors might explain this
over-prediction. First, in our benchmark model, the young start their life with zero wealth
22See Chapter 10 of Press et al. (1992) for details of this method.
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and face a growing income prole; second, the life-cycle consumption prole starts to tilt
down when agents become old, due to a declining survival probability. This implies that
they need less nancial wealth to nance retirement consumption. Finally, the presence of
social security discourages households from saving.
Table 2: General Features of The Benchmark Economy (Initial Steady State)
Variables Ini. St. St. Values U.S. Data
Targeted Variables
Payroll tax rate,  0:107 0:107
r 6:75% 6:73%
K=Y 1:680 1:682
H=Y 1:042 1:043
Non-targeted Variables
Gini coe¢ cient for total wealth 0:73 0:80
Zero (or negative) wealth (%) 22.0 17.6
2.3 Policy Reform
This section explores the long-run e¤ects of eliminating social security. Since our focus is on
the long run, the policy experiment we conduct is to eliminate both social security benets
and contributions simultaneously and allow households to save through private asset markets
for their retirement. We rst report the aggregate statistics and explore the life-cycle proles
of consumption. We then analyze the welfare e¤ects of this policy reform.
2.3.1 Aggregate Statistics
Table 3 summarizes the aggregate statistics. Eliminating social security leads to a 3.43-
percent decrease in the interest rate. Accordingly, the capital-output ratio KY increases by
23.2 percent. Interestingly, the housing-output ratio HY rises by 36.2 percent, more than
ten percent higher than its counterparts for physical capital. The fall in the interest rate
also pushes down the price of housing consumption by 2:72 percent, under the no-arbitrage
condition (4). As a result, we see that aggregate housing consumption (H) increases by 47.2
percent. Aggregate non-durable consumption, to the contrary, decreases by 1.6 percent. In
addition, the total consumption expenditure (C + pH) falls by two percent. Part of this
decline can be accounted for by a 1.4-percent fall in the expenditure on housing services,
pH, under a lower price of housing services. Finally, the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth drops
by seven percent when social security is eliminated. Intuitively, absent social security, even
poor households increase savings to prepare for retirement consumption.
In short, our aggregate statistics indicate that the e¤ects of social security on the two
types of consumption are drastically di¤erent. On the one hand, it substantially reduces
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aggregate housing consumption; on the other hand, aggregate non-durable consumption is
larger when social security is present. Accordingly, the proportional increase in housing stock
is much higher than that of physical capital when social security is eliminated.
Table 3a: Aggregate E¤ects of Social Security (The Benchmark Economy)
Variables Ini. St. St. Fin. St. St.
Replacement rate, # 48:3% 0%
r 6:76% 3:69%
p 8:25% 5:53%
K=Y 1:680 2:070
H=Y 1:042 1:419
(K +H) =Y 2:722 3:489
C 1:27 1:25
H 1:76 2:59
C + pH 1:42 1:39
Gini coe¢ cient for wealth 0:73 0:66
For comparison, we conduct the same policy reform for the one-asset economy. Note
that in this economy, there is one single asset that corresponds to the sum of physical and
housing capital in the data. As a result, housing services are implicitly incorporated in the
aggregate output Y of the one-asset economy. The aggregate consumption, C, a non-durable
good in the one-asset economy; now captures the level of all types of consumption in the real
economy.
Table 3b reports the aggregate statistics for the one-asset economy. When socials security
is eliminated, the interest rate drops by 2.41 percent. The aggregate wealth, as measured
by the KY ratio, increases by 25.8 percent. This number is close to a 28:2-percent increase
in the aggregate capital-output ratio, (K +H) =Y; in the benchmark economy and ranges
between its counterparts for physical capital and housing (23.2 percent and 36.2 percent),
respectively. When social security is eliminated, we see that aggregate consumption, a non-
durable good in this economy, increases by 2:1 percent. This result contrasts sharply with a
slight decline in non-durable consumption in the benchmark economy.23
23The Gini coe¢ cient for wealth at the initial steady state is lower for the one-asset economy than for the
benchmark economy. This is because the calibrated  (and, thus, the value of  (1 + r)) in the one-asset
economy is larger than that in the benchmark economy. As a result, the fraction of the population with zero
wealth in the one-asset economy is merely 12.1 percent.
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Table 3b: Aggregate E¤ects of Social Security (One-Asset Economy)
Variables Ini. St. St. Fin. St. St.
Replacement rate, # 48:3% 0%
r 5:22% 2:81%
K=Y 3:070 3:862
C 1:89 1:93
Gini coe¢ cient for wealth 0:69 0:63
2.3.2 Life-Cycle Proles
In this section, we explore the impact of eliminating social security on the life-cycle patterns
of the two types of consumption.24 Figure 1 plots the life-cycle proles for both housing
and non-durable consumption. Consistent with the data, both housing and non-durable
consumption are hump-shaped. More importantly, the life-cycle impacts of social security
on housing and on non-durable consumption are sharply di¤erent. Social security crowds
out housing consumption throughout most of the life cycle, with a magnitude substantially
larger during the working years. The e¤ect of social security on the pattern of non-durable
consumption, by contrast, is to merely postpone non-durable consumption until late in life.
Such a di¤erence can be potentially explained by the substitution e¤ects of a change in the
price of housing consumption. As equation (4) indicates, the price of housing consumption
the rental price of housing in this economy is positively linked to the interest rate. When
social security is present, a higher interest rate makes housing consumption more expensive
relative to non-durable consumption. As a result, households tend to substitute non-durable
consumption for housing consumption throughout the life cycle. Eliminating social security
has the opposite e¤ect: lowering the interest rate and, thus, the price of currentconsump-
tion. This encourages households not only to consume both types of goods earlier in life, but
also to substitute housing services for non-durable consumption throughout the life cycle.
To highlight the above mechanism, we eliminate social security under the assumption
that interest rates, pre-tax wages and transfers stay unchanged at their initial steady-state
levels.25 Figure 2 plots the life-cycle proles of the two types of consumption, holding
prices xed. It is obvious that, now, the impacts of social security on the two types of
consumption look very di¤erent from those in our benchmark case. First, without a change
in the relative price of housing consumption, the increase in housing consumption over the
24The life-cycle pattern of assets and the impact of social security on it in the benchmark economy is
qualitatively similar to those in the one-asset economy. The gures are available upon request.
25 In this partial equilibrium, social security a¤ects the life-cycle patterns of the two types of consumption
mainly through its e¤ects on lifetime wealth and the e¤ects of payroll taxation on the tightness of borrowing
constraint.
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Figure 1: Housing and Non-durable Consumption over the Life Cycle, Benchmark Economy
life cycle becomes signicantly dampened and similar in magnitude to that of non-durable
consumption. Second, holding the price of current consumption xed, the peaks of the two
types of consumption in the nal steady state are now similar to their counterparts in the
initial steady states. Hence, our counterfactual experiment supports our argument that the
change in the price of currentconsumption is the key mechanism by which social security
a¤ects the life-cycle prole of the two types of consumption.
In short, our life-cycle analysis reveals a sharp di¤erence in the impacts of social security
on the two types of consumption, both at the aggregate level and over the life cycle. This
asymmetry results from the substitution e¤ect of a higher price of housing consumption when
social security is present. Note that this channel is missing in standard life-cycle models,
which assume that all types of consumptions are non-durable and perfectly substitutable in
utility. As a result, standard life-cycle economies suggest that all types of consumption will
change in a similar fashion when social security is eliminated.
2.3.3 Welfare Implications
We now explore the welfare e¤ects of eliminating social security. A caveat to our welfare
analysis is that since we focus on steady-state comparison, we abstract from costs of transition
associated with such a policy reform. Accordingly, our welfare analysis is, at best, suggestive
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Figure 2: E¤ects of Social Security on Household Consumption, Fixed Prices
of how the full welfare results would change in the presence of housing.
Following the literature, the welfare e¤ects of eliminating social security are measured
by the compensating variations, denoted as CV . The compensating variations measure how
much (in percent) the consumption index, dened as ch1 , must be increased at each period
and each contingency in the economy with social security so that a given type of agent is
indi¤erent between the two economies. The welfare gain of eliminating social security for an
unborn agent (before the realization of all contingencies), denoted as w0, is
w0 =
 P
2E ()Vf (0; 0; ; 1)P
2E ()Vp(0; 0; ; 1)
! 1
1 
(5)
where Vp (Vf ) refers to the value in the economy with (without) social security. To better
understand the welfare e¤ects for di¤erent individuals, we classify all agents by the types of
shocks to labor productivity they receive at the beginning of the rst age. Agents who receive
initial productivity shock i, i = 1; ::; 7, are referred to as type-i agents. For a newborn type-i
agent, the welfare gain of eliminating social security, denoted as wi, is
wi =

Vf (0; 0; i; 1)
Vp(0; 0; i; 1)
 1
1 
(6)
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Note that if a given agent experiences welfare loss under the privatized system, this number
is negative.
Table 4 reports the welfare e¤ects of eliminating social security in the benchmark econ-
omy. The rst column reports the welfare results for the general equilibrium. As its rst row
shows, an unborn agent would experience a welfare gain of about 20 percent of consumption
at each state if she were born into an economy without social security. This welfare gain,
moreover, holds robustly for each type of agents. Another noteworthy result is that the
magnitude of the welfare gain is larger for poorer households.
Table 4: Welfare E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security in the Benchmark Economy
CV (%) General Equi. Fixed Prices Di¤erence
Aggregate Welfare Gain
w0 20.03 7.64 12.39
Welfare Gain Across Types of Agents
w1 25.06 7.47 17.59
w2 23.25 7.53 15.72
w3 21.24 7.54 13.70
w4 19.22 7.58 11.64
w5 17.12 7.78 9.34
w6 14.62 8.28 6.34
w7 11.65 8.89 2.76
We would like to understand what drives the above welfare e¤ects, especially for the
poor households. To this end, we compute the compensating variations, holding prices xed
at their initial steady-state level. The second column of Table 4 reports our results in this
case. The di¤erence from their counterparts in the general equilibrium, as listed in the third
column, captures the general equilibrium e¤ects: welfare e¤ects of eliminating social security
due to a change in factor prices.
We see that holding prices xed, the aggregate welfare gain of eliminating social secu-
rity is reduced by more than half. This indicates that the general equilibrium e¤ect is the
main channel for the welfare gain from eliminating social security. Moreover, in this partial
equilibrium, richer households tend to benet more from abolishing social security. Corre-
spondingly, the magnitude of the general equilibrium e¤ect declines with initial productivity
types. Our counterfactual exercise, therefore, suggests that the general equilibrium e¤ect
is one key reason why poorer households tend to benet more from eliminating social se-
curity.26 The intuition is simple: A fall in the interest rate and an increase in wage rates
26Another key factor for poorer households to benet more from eliminating social security is the presence
of borrowing constraints. When borrowing constraints are missing, we nd that the welfare gain for poor
households becomes much smaller. This leads to a more signicantly increasing pattern of welfare gain across
household types.
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create a larger welfare benet for households with a higher fraction of labor earnings in total
household income. This e¤ect is missing in a partial equilibrium, in which an abolishment of
redistribution from the rich to the poor tends to generate higher welfare benets for richer
households.
In Appendix 5.4.2, we compare the welfare consequences of eliminating social security
among the benchmark economy, the one-asset economy, and the economy with housing tenure
choice (to be constructed in the next section). Also, we decompose the overall welfare e¤ects
into several channels to understand the welfare di¤erences among these economies.
3 An Economy with Housing-tenure Choice
Our benchmark economy abstracts away several realistic frictions in the housing markets.
Accordingly, the model is silent on the observed housing tenure choice and portfolio allocation
and the e¤ects of social security along these margins. In this section, we construct a model
that attempts to capture these two missing margins. In particular, we add three types of
housing frictions into the benchmark model: First, there are rental-market frictions. Second,
there is a down-payment requirement for housing purchase. Third, selling a house involves
transaction cost. The presence of these frictions leads to a nontrivial role of housing tenure
choice and portfolio allocation over a households life cycle. We call this economy the
economy with housing tenure.
3.1 The Model
The economy shares many similarities with the benchmark model. In this economy, house-
holds derive utility from both housing services and non-durable consumption. In each pe-
riod, households are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and
mortality risks. The only nancial instrument available for households is a risk-free bond.
Moreover, a constant returns-to-scale production technology turns physical capital and labor
into aggregate output, which can be consumed or invested in physical capital or housing on a
one-to-one basis. An unfunded social security system taxes labor earnings and redistributes
them as retirement benets uniformly across current retirees. In each period, the govern-
ment collects the accidental bequest and distributes it uniformly to households alive in next
period, after production takes place.27
The detailed di¤erence in modeling is as follows. For consistency, the notations of all
variables in this economy follow those in the benchmark economy, unless we explicitly state
otherwise.
27The accidental bequests now include both housing and nancial assets.
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3.1.1 Housing Capital and Housing Services
In each period, households can either rent housing at a rental price p or own a house to
obtain housing service ows. A homeowner can hold housing assets h 2 (0; h], where h is
a su¢ ciently large number so that it never binds. A non-convex transaction cost  (h; h0) ;
in addition, is incurred each time a household changes its holdings of housing stock. The
non-convex adjustment cost function ensures that the adjustment of housing assets is lumpy
and infrequent. Renters, on the other hand, can change the quantity of their housing services
without paying any transaction cost.
In order to purchase housing, the household must make a down payment. More speci-
cally, a homeowner can borrow only up to a fraction 1   of the value of her end-of-period
housing stock, where  is the down-payment ratio.
We model the rental-market frictions by assuming that owner-occupied housing and rental
housing depreciate at di¤erent rates. Specically, owner-occupied housing (rental housing)
depreciates at a rate o (r) at the beginning of each period: This di¤erence may capture
the idea that, in practice, rental housing typically involves larger maintenance costs due to
the moral hazard problem inherent in housing rental.
We again introduce nancial institutions for simplicity. A nancial intermediary can
now use householdsdeposit for three purposes: to purchase housing for renting, to nance
loans to homeowners, or to use it as physical capital to rent to the producers of non-durable
good in the next period. With all borrowing and lending being intermediated and all rental-
housing units being owned by nancial institutions, the housing stock held by households
corresponds to owner-occupied housing only. As a result, there is no need to keep track of
the fraction of owner-occupied housing in a households total housing stock.
3.1.2 The Households Problem
Households were born into the economy with neither nancial assets nor housing. With
housing tenure choice, the beginning-of-period owner-occupied housing, h; enters the house-
holds state variables. In each period, a households problem can break down into two
sub-problems. First, households choose housing tenure. Second, given housing tenure, a
homeowner purchases housing, non-durable consumption, and saves or borrows into risk-free
nancial asset. A renter, on the other hand, chooses housing services to be purchased from
nancial intermediaries, non-durable consumption and savings in the risk-free nancial asset.
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The problem for a homeowner can be written recursively as
V o (a; h; ; j) = max
c;a0;h0
8<:u  c; h0+  jX
0

 
0 p 

V
 
a0; h0; 0; j + 1
9=; (7)
s:t:
c+ h0 + a0 = (1 + r)a+ w (1  ) j + (1  o)h  (h; h0) + I (j) b+ Tr (8)
a0    (1  )h0 (9)
c; h0  0 (10)
Equation (8) is the budget constraint for a homeowner; equation (9) is the down-payment
constraint and equation (10) is the non-negative constraint for non-durables and owner-
occupied housing.
The problem for a renter is similar to its counterpart in the benchmark economy.
V r (a; h; ; j) = max
c;;a0;s
8<:u (c; d) +  jX
0

 
0 p 

V
 
a0; 0; 0; j + 1
9=;
s:t:
c+ pd+ a0 = (1 + r)a+ w (1  ) j + (1  o)h  (h; 0) + I (j) b
c; a0  0
Di¤erent from a homeowner, a renter faces a non-borrowing constraint, because she has no
collateral to borrow against.
For simplicity, there is no di¤erence between interest rates for borrowing and for lending,
and renegotiation of debt involves no cost. Clearly, under this assumption, a households
allocation between nancial assets and debt is indeterminate given a. Therefore, we interpret
a as net nancial assets.
Households make housing tenure choice at the beginning of each period, by comparing
the value of being a homeowner with that of being a renter.
V (a; h; ; j) = max fV o; V rg (11)
In our economy, housing tenure choice involves a comparison between the price of rental
housing services and the shadow price of owner-occupied housing. Several factors determine
the wedge between the two. First, as discussed below, the higher is the depreciation rate for
rental housing compared to that of owner-occupied housing, the larger this wedge tends to be
and, thus, the more likely a household is to choose to be a homeowner. Second, a household
tends to choose to rent housing if the borrowing constraint it faces is tight. This is because
when the borrowing constraint is binding, renting can a¤ord more housing services. Third,
the presence of housing transaction costs increases the user cost of owner-occupied housing
relative to rental housing and discourages households from being homeowners.
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To understand housing tenure decision, we compute the user cost of owner-occupied
housing in the absence of borrowing constraints and transaction costs. One natural way to
interpret the user cost of housing is from the perspective of a homeowner with a full down
payment (equity nance). Since housing tenure choice is made at the beginning of each period
t, the period-t cost of purchasing one unit of housing is 1; as it represents the opportunity
cost of giving up one unit of deposit. At the beginning of period t+1; a homeowner can sell
housing and, for each unit of housing, get back 1  o; the present discounted value of which
at time t is 1 
o
1+r0 : Therefore, the net period-t cost of acquiring one unit of owner-occupied
housing service is 1  1 o1+r0 = r
0+o
1+r0 :
In practice, many households purchase housing with mortgage debt. Hence, it is more
intuitive to reinterpret the user cost of housing as the cost of acquiring one unit of housing
services with full debt nancing: Suppose that, today, a household purchases one unit of
housing without a down payment. Tomorrow, the homeowner can sell the housing after
repaying all her outstanding debt and interest. Since the total amount of debt repayment is
1+r0 and the revenue from selling housing is 1 o; the cost of acquiring one unit of housing
with debt nancing today is 1+r
0 (1 o)
1+r0 =
r0+o
1+r0 :
In both cases, a reduction in the shadow price of housing services due to a fall in interest
rates leads to a lower user cost of housing. For a homeowner with full equity nance, this
represents a reduction in the opportunity cost of home equity. For a homeowner with debt
nancing, this implies a lower interest payment and, thus, a lower cost of debt nancing.28
As a result, both types of homeowners tend to consume more housing services. Note that a
fall in the cost of debt nancing corresponds to a fall in the mortgage interest payments in
the real economy, where mortgage contracts are widely used.
3.1.3 The Financial Intermediarys Problem
The nancial intermediaries problem is similar to their counterparts in the benchmark
economy. Again, we assume that the market for nancial intermediaries is competitive, so
that at equilibrium, each nancial intermediary earns zero prot. This implies that the
equilibrium rental price of housing is
p =
r0 + r
1 + r0
Note that if r > o; the rental price is higher than the user cost of owner-occupied housing.
As a result, in the absence of other housing market frictions, a household would prefer to be
a homeowner.
28 In our model, the interest rates for borrowing and for lending are the same. If we extend the current
model to allow borrowing and lending rates to di¤er, a fall in the lending rate due to eliminating social security
will trigger a fall in the borrowing rate at equilibrium. Still, this implies a lower user cost of owner-occupied
housing for homeowners with both equity and debt nancing.
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A formal denition of stationary equilibrium is provided in Appendix 7.1.29
3.2 Calibration
The calibration of the demography, technology, endowment, preference and social security
system follows their counterparts in the benchmark economy. The detailed di¤erence is as
follows.
The annual depreciation rate for rental housing is chosen to match the corresponding data
for rental properties. Using data on actual real estate transactions for single-family houses,
Shilling, Sirmans and Dombrow (1991) estimate that the average rst-year depreciation rate
for rental properties is 0.0254. Therefore, we choose r = 0:0254: We then choose values for
o; the discount factor,  and the share of non-durable consumption in the utility function, 
to jointly match the long-run home-ownership rate, the KY ratio and the
H
Y ratio in the U.S.
data. According to the American Housing Survey, the home-ownership rate in the period
1982-1994 was 64.1 percent.30 Accordingly, o = 0:013;  = 0:9578 and  = 0:8954:
The transaction cost function for selling housing is set as (h; h0) = Ih0'h, where
Ih0 =
(
1 if h0 6= h
0 if h0 = h
Implicit in the above function is that each time a homeowner changes her housing stock, she
needs to sell her current housing assets rst. This selling incurs a loss proportional to the
selling price. We choose ' = 0:05; the typical fee charged by real estate brokers in the U.S.
The down-payment ratio  is set to 20 percent, which is the average down-payment ratio of
primary mortgage loans in the U.S.
Table 5 summarizes the parameter values specic to this economy.
Table 5: Parameter Values for the Economy w/ Housing Tenure
Symbol Denition Value
r Depreciation rate for rental housing 0:0254
o Depreciation rate for owner-occupied housing 0:0130
' Transaction cost 0:05
 Discount factor in utility function 0:9578
 Share of non-durable consumption in utility function 0:8954
 Down payment ratio 0:20
29The timing of events in each period is similar to that in the benchmark economy.
30After a long period of stability, the home-ownership rate in the U.S. took o¤ in 1995, increasing from 64.7
percent in 1995 to 69 percent in 2004. Since our model is intended to capture the housing tenure choice in
the long run, we ignore the period from 1995 on when computing the average home ownership rate. A larger
targeted home-ownership rate requires a further decrease in o; which, as we will show below, strengthens the
incentive to be homeowners and our major results.
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3.2.1 General Features
As a starting point, we would like to explore how well the model is able to replicate housing
tenure choices, portfolio allocation and wealth inequality observed in the data. Figure 3 plots
the model-generated age prole of home-ownership rates, as well as its data counterpart.31
We see that our model is able to replicate the life-cycle prole of home ownership reasonably
well. Both the model and the data feature a hump shape in home-ownership rates with a peak
around age 60. The reason for this hump shape is as follows: Though rental-market frictions
encourage households to purchase housing, down-payment constraints prevent households,
especially the poor, from being homeowners early in life. In addition, the presence of hous-
ing transaction costs encourages households to postpone home purchase, since they would
like to reduce the frequency of moving. On the other hand, as households approach the
terminal period, the expected tenure in the housing becomes shorter. To avoid mandatory
housing-selling cost upon death, some households will tend to be renters. We conclude that,
overall, our model is able to capture the life-cycle housing tenure decision for U.S. households
reasonably well.
We now ask how the model is able to match householdsportfolio choice. Table 6 shows
that the model generates an average share of owner-occupied housing in total net worth
that is very close to its data counterpart.32 Regarding the leverage, the model generates an
average loan-to-housing-value ratio of 47:8 percent among borrowers.33 This value is higher
than its counterpart in the data (33.4 percent), measured as the mean ratio of principal
residence debt to the value of the primary residence (see Wol¤, 2004, Table 4). The high
loan-to-value ratio in our model could result from our assumption that the minimum size of
owner-occupied housing is zero. As a result, even very poor households, who tend to have
high leverage, will try to use debt nancing to buy owner-occupied housing.34
31The data source of the home-ownership rate is the U.S. Census Bureau. For each year between 1982 and
1999, the home-ownership rate is provided in 5-year age intervals up to age 80. We take the average of home-
ownership rates across di¤erent years and linearly extrapolate the home-ownership rate for the age interval
81-85. Correspondingly, to compare with the data we also average the model-generated home ownership for
each of the ve-year age intervals. For example, in Figure 3, home ownership at age 20 corresponds to the
average home ownership between ages 20 and 24.
32The data are computed by the author according to Table 4 of Wol¤ (2004). According to Wol¤ (2004), in
2001 data for the Survey of Consumer Finance, the share of principal residence in gross assets is 28.2 percent,
and the share of liabilities in gross assets is 12.5 percent. Therefore, the share of principal residence in net
worth (the di¤erence between gross asset and liabilities) is 32.2 percent.
33Since, in our model, a households allocation between nancial assets and debt is indeterminate given a,
the model-generated loan-to-value ratio constitutes a lower bound for the ratio of mortgage debt to housing
value.
34A larger minimum size of owner-occupied housing discourages households from being homeowners due to
the presence of borrowing constraints.
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Figure 3: Home-ownership Rate over the Life Cycle, Model and Data
Table 6: General Features of The Economy with Housing Tenure (Initial Steady State)
Variables Ini. St. St. Values U.S. Data
Targeted Variables
Payroll tax rate,  0:107 0:107
r 6:73% 6:73%
K=Y 1:682 1:682
H=Y 1:042 1:043
Home ownership rate 64% 64:1%
Non-targeted Variables
Ho= (A+Ho) 32:2% 32:2%
Mean loan-to-value ratio (for borrowers) 47:8% 33:4%
Gini coe¢ cient for total wealth 0:73 0:80
Gini coe¢ cient for nancial wealth 0.93 0.94
Gini coe¢ cient for housing 0.53 0.64
The model also delivers implications on wealth inequality. Interestingly, our Gini coe¢ -
cient for wealth, 0.73, is close in magnitude to its counterpart in the benchmark economy.
The last two rows of Table 6 show that this is jointly determined by both a high Gini coe¢ -
cient of nancial wealth (0.93) and a relatively low Gini coe¢ cient for housing (0.53), though
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our Gini coe¢ cient for housing is lower than its data counterpart.35 In our model, while
the presence of collateral borrowing raises the inequality for nancial assets, the presence of
housing as a durable good pushes down inequality for net worth.
In short, our model can well capture housing tenure choice, portfolio allocation, and
wealth distribution. This renders our model a useful benchmark to explore the impacts
of social security reforms on housing tenure and portfolio choice and, in particular, for
households with di¤erent income levels.
3.3 Policy Reform
We now consider the e¤ects of eliminating social security in this economy. We rst report the
aggregate statistics and compare them with their counterparts in the benchmark economy.
We then explore the implications of social security on life-cycle housing tenure choice and
portfolio allocation. Finally, we investigate the e¤ects of social security on housing position
for households of di¤erent income levels.
3.3.1 Aggregate Statistics
Table 7 shows the e¤ects of social security on various economic aggregates. Despite the
sharp di¤erence in the degrees of housing market frictions, the aggregate e¤ects of eliminat-
ing social security are very similar in the two economies. As shown by the rst two columns,
in the economy with housing tenure, the proportional increase in the housing-output ratio,
H=Y ; (36.7 percent) is much higher than that for physical capital (23.2 percent). Similarly,
aggregate housing consumption increases by 44.3 percent, while aggregate non-housing con-
sumption slightly decreases. Housing rental prices again drop by 2.69 percent, indicating
that the above asymmetric impacts result from the substitution e¤ects of a fall in the cost of
housing consumption. Note that, in this economy, a fall in the interest rate not only lowers
the market price of rental housing, but also reduces the shadow price of owner-occupied
housing by the same magnitude.
35The data for Gini coe¢ cient on housing and nancial assets are from Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008,
Table 1) and are computed using the data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance.
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Table 7: Aggregate E¤ects of Social Security in The Two Economies with Housing
Economy w/ Housing Tenure Benchmark Economy
Variables Ini. St. St. Fin. St. St. Ini. St. St. Fin. St. St.
Replacement rate, # 48:3% 0 48:3% 0
r 6:73% 3:68% 6:76% 3:69%
p 8:69% 6:00% 8:25% 5:53%
K=Y 1:682 2:072 1:680 2:070
H=Y 1:042 1:382 1:042 1:419
C 1:27 1:26 1:27 1:25
H 1:76 2:54 1:76 2:59
Gini coe¢ cient for wealth 0:73 0:68 0:73 0:66
Ho 1:47 2:08 - -
Ho= (A+Ho) 32:2% 32:9% - -
Home ownership rate 64% 67:9% - -
Average age of rst-time home-buyers 29 28 - -
Average size of owner-occupied housing 2:36 3:14 - -
Mean loan-to-value ratio (for borrowers) 47:8% 45:9% - -
Aggregate debt-to-output ratio 8:67% 10:96% - -
What explains the quantitative similarity of the aggregate e¤ects of eliminating social
security? In the economy with housing tenure, the introduction of rental-market frictions
encourages households to borrow to nance home purchase. Many of these households are
poor and, therefore, hold a negligible fraction of aggregate physical capital and a very small
fraction of aggregate housing. This is evidenced by a high Gini coe¢ cient for nancial assets
and owner-occupied housing in the initial steady state. As a result, they are not important for
the changes in aggregate physical capital and housing stock following social security reform.
The quantitative impacts of social security on aggregate physical capital and housing are,
therefore, very similar across these two economies. Accordingly, the magnitudes of a fall in
the interest rate and, thus, the price of housing consumption are very close to each other.
Despite the quantitative similarities of the aggregate e¤ects, the economy with housing
tenure delivers unique implications for the e¤ects of social security on householdsportfolio
allocation and housing tenure choice. First, we see that an increase in housing consumption
at the aggregate level leads to a signicant increase in owner-occupied housing, Ho (41.5
percent). By contrast, the percentage increase in nancial asset, A; is only 36.9 percent. As
a result, the share of owner-occupied housing in householdsnet worth slightly increases.
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The increase in Ho can be further decomposed into changes in the home-ownership rate
and changes in the average size of owner-occupied housing.36 Home ownership rate, as Table
7 shows, increases by 3:9 percent when social security is privatized. Moreover, the average
size of owner-occupied housing, computed as the total size of owner-occupied housing divided
by the measure of homeowners, increases by 33.1 percent.
An increase in housing position also encourages more households to borrow when they
become homeowners. Accordingly, the aggregate debt-to-output ratio increases by more than
two percent when social security is privatized.37 The mean loan-to-value ratio for borrowers,
however, is reduced by about two percent. Intuitively, when social security is eliminated,
old households have to rely on their own savings in nancial assets to nance non-durable
consumption. As a result, most retirees will pay o¤ their mortgage debt and switch to net
savers in nancial assets (Figure not shown).
3.3.2 Life-Cycle Prole
We now investigate the life-cycle e¤ects of social security. As Figure 4 shows, the impacts
of social security on the two types of consumption are quantitatively very similar to those
in the benchmark economy (Figure 1). The reason is simple: As our benchmark analysis
shows, the main driving force for the asymmetric impacts of social security on the two types
of consumption is the change in the relative price of housing consumption. Due to the
quantitative similarity in aggregate impacts of social security, it is not surprising that its
e¤ects on the life-cycle consumption proles are similar in the two economies.
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of eliminating social security on the life-cycle prole of
home-ownership rates. We see that this reform encourages more households above age 35 to
be homeowners. In particular, it boosts the home-ownership rate by about 10 percent for
households between ages 40 and 60, ages when housing consumption peaks in the nal steady
state. The average home ownership rate for households below age 35, however, declines, and
for households beyond age 75, it barely changes.
In the presence of housing market frictions, two main channels underlie the above e¤ects of
social security on home-ownership rates. The rst channel stems from the presence of down-
payment constraint. The payroll taxation of social security reduces householdsdisposable
income. With down-payment constraints, this forces many of them to be renters, despite the
fact that owner-occupied housing is cheaper. Accordingly, an increase in disposable income
due to the elimination of payroll taxation tends to increase the home-ownership rate.
The second channel is through the e¤ects of social security on the prices of housing
36Since the measure of population in our model is 1, Ho = home ownership rate  average size of owner-
occupied housing.
37Note, again, this represents a lower bound for the increase in mortgage debtto-output ratio.
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Figure 5: Home-ownership Rate Over the Life Cycle
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consumption and, thus, housing consumption over the life cycle.38 As shown in Figure 4,
without social security housing consumption is much higher during the working years, with a
peak at around age 50. Due to the presence of housing transaction costs, a household would
prefer to own a house in which the expected tenure is su¢ ciently long. Eliminating social
security, thus, encourages households to postpone home purchase, until they have accumu-
lated enough nancial assets to meet the down payment of a desired larger house. Moreover,
housing consumption features a downward pattern along retirement ages, especially without
social security. Since it is costly for households to downsize their housing frequently, elim-
inating social security also discourages the old from being homeowners. Note that the role
of the second channel for home-ownership rates relies critically on the presence of housing
transaction costs.
We now shut down the second channel by setting housing transaction costs to zero in both
steady states. In this counterfactual economy, only the rst channel by relaxing the down-
payment constraints plays a role. This is because, without both borrowing constraints and
housing transaction costs, social security would not a¤ect home ownership at all: In both
steady states, all households would choose to be homeowners throughout the life cycle, due
to the presence of rental frictions.
Figure 6 plots the home-ownership rate between the two steady states in this counterfac-
tual economy. Two importance di¤erences exist between Figures 5 and 6. First, eliminating
social security now increases home-ownership rates throughout the life cycle, including the
youngest ages. The second noticeable di¤erence is that, without social security, almost all
retirees become homeowners except those approaching the terminal period. Accordingly,
the increase in home-ownership rates tends to be higher for elderly households. These dif-
ferences support our argument that the second channel is the key to understanding why
home-ownership rates reduce for the young households and barely change for the old when
social security is eliminated.
Figure 7 illustrates the impacts of social security on the life-cycle proles of the two
assets. We see that in each steady state, the life-cycle proles of both assets are hump-
shaped, though such a pattern is much more pronounced for nancial assets than for owner-
occupied housing. More importantly, the impacts of eliminating social security on the life-
cycle patterns of the two assets exhibit a sharp di¤erence. On the one hand, eliminating social
security encourages households to accumulate more owner-occupied housing throughout the
life cycle, especially between ages 40 and 60, when the home-ownership rate is high. The
reason is simple: A higher housing consumption increases the demand for owner-occupied
housing, especially during ages with a high home-ownership rate. On the other hand, this
38 In addition, an increase in lifetime earnings due to eliminating social security will increase the desired size
of owner-occupied housing. However, as our previous life-cycle analysis indicates, the quantitative importance
of this e¤ect is not large relative to the channel via changes in the price of housing services.
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Figure 8: E¤ects of Social Security on Household Portfolio Allocation, Fixed Prices
policy reform leads to more borrowing and less savings in nancial assets early in life. Note
that the expansion in borrowing early in life is closely linked to the increased purchase of
owner-occupied housing. Only around the retirement age, the crowding-out of nancial assets
by social security becomes signicantly larger. This is because social security, as mandatory
savings for retirement, serves as a substitute for nancial assets.
Figure 8 plots the life-cycle proles of the two types of assets, holding factor prices xed as
their initial steady-state levels. Under this counterfactual experiment, the life-cycle impact
of social security on owner-occupied housing is mostly driven by the joint e¤ect of a tighter
borrowing constraint and a lower lifetime income. Consistent with a much smaller e¤ect on
housing consumption, we see that owner-occupied housing barely changes throughout the
life cycle. This indicates that the substantial increase in owner-occupied housing in general
equilibrium again is largely driven by a lower shadow price of housing consumption, or the
user cost of housing.
In summary, we nd that with both housing market frictions and the feature of hous-
ing as a durable good, eliminating social security signicantly increases home-ownership
rates, mostly around middle age. Moreover, under rental-market frictions, higher housing
consumption leads to larger owner-occupied housing when social security is eliminated.
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3.3.3 Heterogeneity of Impacts across Households
Our previous discussion indicates that eliminating social security increases housing positions
along both the extensive margin (allowing more households to become homeowners) and the
intensive margin (allowing homeowners to purchase larger housing). We now explore in more
details the magnitude of these e¤ects on households of di¤erent income levels.
Home-ownership rate Which types of agents account for the increases in the aggregate-
level home-ownership rate? Table 8 reports the impacts of eliminating social security on
home-ownership rate across households of di¤erent initial productivity. It is not surpris-
ing that due to down-payment constraints, home-ownership rates are higher among richer
households in both steady states. More importantly, when social security is eliminated,
home-ownership rates increase signicantly for the poor, but fall for richer households. In
other words, the increase in the home-ownership rate at the aggregate level is explained
solely by the corresponding increase among the poor.
Table 8: Home-ownership Rate By Household Types
Ini. St. St. Final St. St. Di¤erence
Aggregate 64 67.9 3.9
Type 1 19.5 36.8 17.3
Type 2 27.3 45.5 18.2
Type 3 43.3 56.0 12.7
Type 4 70.1 68.1 -2.0
Type 5 85.4 81.7 -3.7
Type 6 96.5 91.7 -4.8
Type 7 99.1 98.5 -0.6
To explain such a heterogeneous pattern, recall that two opposite channels, as we dis-
cussed in the last section, govern the e¤ects of social security on home-ownership rates for
each types of households. We now shut down the second channel by setting housing trans-
action costs to zero. Table 9 reports the e¤ects of social security on home-ownership rates
in this counterfactual economy. Several points are worth mentioning. First, the increase in
the aggregate home-ownership rate, 7.8 percent, is twice as much as its counterpart with
housing transaction costs. This suggests that without housing transaction costs, households
tend to become homeowners earlier in life to satisfy their increased demand for housing
consumption when social security is eliminated. Second, the larger increase in the aggre-
gate home-ownership rate in this counterfactual economy is attributed mainly to a larger
corresponding increase among the rich. Combined with the results in Table 8, this suggests
that with housing transaction costs, eliminating social security encourages richer households
to postpone their rst-time housing purchase, because they want to accumulate enough
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wealth to buy a larger house. Finally, the magnitude of the increase in the home-ownership
rate now decreases monotonically along householdstypes. Obviously, what is behind this
monotonic relationship is the rst channel: The poorer are the households, the more binding
are their borrowing constraints and the larger is the e¤ect of eliminating social security on
their disposable income. And the stronger is the impact of the rst channel.
Table 9: Home-ownership Rate By Household Types (w/o Adjustment Cost)
Ini. St. St. Final St. St. Di¤erence
Aggregate 67.5 75.3 7.8
Type 1 23.1 39.8 16.7
Type 2 32.9 49.0 16.1
Type 3 47.9 63.6 15.7
Type 4 75.0 79.7 4.7
Type 5 87.9 89.4 1.5
Type 6 98.9 99.4 0.5
Type 7 99.1 99.4 0.3
Average size of owner-occupied housing Now we consider how eliminating social se-
curity a¤ects the size of owner-occupied housing for di¤erent types of homeowners.39 In our
model, a change in the size of owner-occupied housing is driven mainly by two components:
an increase in the size of housing by households who would choose to be homeowners in both
steady states, referred to as the incumbent e¤ect; and an e¤ect capturing the di¤erence
between the size of housing chosen by new homeowners when social security is eliminated and
those who would be homeowners in both steady states, referred to as the entrant e¤ect.
Through these two components, the same two key channels a¤ect the average size of
housing, apart from home-ownership rates. The rst channel, through which eliminating
payroll tax increases home ownership, leads to a negative entrant e¤ect on the average size
of owner-occupied housing. This is because in the nal steady state, new homeowners, with
a relaxed borrowing constraint, tend to buy a house smaller than those of households who
would be homeowners even when social security is present. On the other hand, the second
channel creates a positive incumbent e¤ect on the average size of housing, via a lower price
of housing services.
Table 10 reports the e¤ects of social security on the average size of owner-occupied
housing. As the last column shows, its increase in the average size of owner-occupied housing
is concentrated among rich homeowners. For the poor, the average size of housing actually
declines. This implies that the rst channel dominates for the poor. Intuitively, eliminating
39A more careful approach to exploring the intensive margin is to track the change in the size of owner-
occupied housing for existing homeowners following Social Security reform. This would involve an analysis
on the transitional path, which we leave for future research.
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social security encourages a large fraction of poor households who would be renters in the
initial steady state to become homeowners. Since these new homeowners desire smaller
housing, the average size of owner-occupied housing for poor households is pushed down
in the new steady state.40 Richer households, by contrast, are less subject to borrowing
constraints. Accordingly, the e¤ects of eliminating social security on the size of their housing
works mainly through the second channel.
Table 10: Size of Owner-Occupied Housing By Household Type
Ini. St. St. Final St. St. Di¤erence
Aggregate 2.36 3.14 0.78
Type 1 1.40 1.32 -0.08
Type 2 1.64 1.60 -0.04
Type 3 1.80 2.07 0.27
Type 4 1.96 2.67 0.71
Type 5 2.33 3.40 1.07
Type 6 2.91 4.37 1.46
Type 7 3.76 5.58 1.62
In order to quantify the importance of the second channel for the size of housing belonging
to di¤erent types of homeowners, we abolish social security, holding prices xed as in the
initial steady state. Table 11 reports the changes in the average size of housing under
both xed prices and general equilibrium. We see that under xed prices, the average size
of housing at the aggregate level is even smaller when social security is absent. The last
column indicates that this is due mainly to a reduction of the average size of housing for rich
households. Thus, our result suggests that when social security is eliminated, the signicant
increase in the size of housing among the rich is largely driven by the second channel, that
is, via a lower user cost of housing.
Table 11: E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security on the Size of Owner-Occupied Housing
Fixed Price General Equi. Di¤erence
Aggregate -0.01 0.78 -0.79
Type 1 -0.27 -0.08 -0.19
Type 2 -0.30 -0.04 -0.26
Type 3 -0.26 0.27 -0.53
Type 4 0.05 0.71 -0.66
Type 5 0.15 1.07 -0.92
Type 6 0.25 1.46 -1.21
Type 7 0.41 1.62 -1.21
40We nd that in an economy without borrowing limits, the average sizes of housing increase for all types
of households when Social Security is eliminated. The results are available upon request.
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In summary, we nd that the impacts of social security on housing position exhibit sub-
stantial heterogeneity among households of di¤erent income levels. For poor households,
home-ownership rates rise signicantly, while the average size of housing declines. By con-
trast, richer households tend to postpone their housing purchase to enjoy larger housing.
As a consequence, the increase in the aggregate home-ownership rate is driven solely by the
increase of the poor, while the rich account for the increase in the average size of housing.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate two features of housing in a life-cycle analysis of social security:
housing as a durable good and housing market frictions. We nd that with housing as
a durable good, unfunded social security substantially crowds out housing consumption
throughout the life cycle. By contrast, aggregate non-durable consumption is higher when
social security is present, although it is postponed until late in life. Moreover, in the presence
of housing market frictions, social security lowers the aggregate home-ownership rate and
reduces the average size of owner-occupied housing. The e¤ects of social security on housing
position, furthermore, exhibit substantial heterogeneity across households of di¤erent income
levels.
It is important to note that our model leaves out several issues that warrant future
research. First, in the current framework, it would be interesting to study the transitional
path of eliminating social security. In particular, the key mechanism in this paper by which
eliminating social security a¤ects the price of housing consumption depends on an increase
in private savings, which necessarily take time to be accumulated. Second, in our economy,
bequest motives are absent and all agents were born without housing assets. Our model
has the potential to distinguish the impacts of social security reform between two types of
individuals: those who receive housing as bequests and those who do not. Moreover, our
model abstracts from housing-price risks and the rent risk, as well as other risky assets, such
as stocks. The incorporation of these uninsurable risks may reveal richer implications of the
impacts of social security on portfolio allocations and welfare.
In addition, our life-cycle framework with housing tenure choice is suitable to address
a variety of other macroeconomic and policy issues. Such issues may include the impact
of demographics say, the baby boom and population aging on housing prices in the low
frequency and the impacts of other retirement policies, such as the introduction of tax-
deferred accounts, on householdsconsumption and savings.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Denition of the Stationary Equilibrium
We now dene the stationary equilibrium. Let J = f1; :::Jg and let S = RR+  E J:
Let B (R) and B (R+) be the -algebra of R and R+, respectively, and P(E) and P(J) be
the power set of E and J, respectively. Let S =B (R)  B (R+)  P(E)P(J) and let M
be the set of nite measures over the measurable space (S;S) : Denote s = fa; h; ; jg as the
individual state variables. Let  (s) denote the measure of individuals with state s:
Denition 1 Given a replacement rate #; a stationary equilibrium consists of value func-
tion fV; V o; V rg for the households, a set of individual policy functions fc; d; a0; h0g ; produc-
tion plan fY; K; Ng for the representative rm, an allocation for nancial intermediaryn
A0;Hr0 ;K 0
o
, a set of prices fr, w, pg and a nite measure  2 M; such that
1. Given fr; w; pg, V; V o and V r solve the individuals problem (11) ; (7) and (1) ; re-
spectively, with c; d; a0; h0 as the associated policy functions.
2. fr; wg are such that the maximization problem of the representative rm is solved.
r = ZFK (K;N)  k (12)
w = ZFN (K;N)
3. p is such that the nancial intermediarys problem is solved.
4. The social security policies satisfy
b =
#wNR
(da dh d  f1; :::; jr   1g)
wN = b
Z
(da dh d  fjr; :::; Jg)
5. Individual and aggregate behaviors are consistent
A0 =
Z
a0(s) (da dh d  dj)
N =
Z
j (da dh d  dj)
C =
Z
c(s) (da dh d  dj)
H 0 =
Z
h0 (s)  (da dh d  dj)
Hr
0
=
Z
h0=0
d (s) (da dh d  dj)
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6. Transfer are given by
Tr
=
"
(1 + r0)
R  
1   j

a0(s) (da dh d  dj)
+ (1  o) Rh0>0 h0 (s)  (da dh d  dj)
#
= (1 + n) (13)
7. Markets clear
(a) Housing-rental market clears.
Hr
0
= H 0  Ho0 (14)
where Hr
0
=
R
h0=0 d(s) (da dh d  dj) ; Ho
0
=
R
h0>0 h
0 (s)  (da dh d  dj) :
(b) Goods market clears
C +Xh +Xk +
Z

 
h; h0(s)

 (da dh d  dj) = Y (15)
where
Xk = K
0  

1  k

K
Xh = Xr +Xo
Xr = H
r0   (1  r)Hr
Xo = H
o0  

1  h

Ho
(c) Asset market clears.
K 0 +Hr
0
(1  p) = A0
(d) All factor markets clear.
8. The law of motion for  is stationary
T () = 
where the operator T : M!M can be explicitly expressed as:
a. for all J such that 1 =2 J , all A  H  E 2 B (R)  B (R+)  P(E), and all
s = fa; h; ; jg 2 S
T () (AH  E  J) =
Z
P (s;AH  E  J)  (da dh d  dj)
where
P (s;AH  E  J) =
8><>:
X
02E
 j (
0 p ) if j + 1 2 J; a0(s) 2 A and h0(s) 2 H
0 else
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b. for all AH  E 2 B (R)  B (R+) P(E)
T () (AH  E  1) =
8><>:
X
2E
1() if 0 2 A and 0 2 H
0 else
5.2 Calibration of Capital Income Share in Economies with Housing
In this section, we describe the procedure of our calibration of the capital income share  for
economies with housing. We use data from the 2003 revision of National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed Asset Tables (FAT) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
for the years 1954-2000. The calibration procedure follows Cooley and Prescott (1995) and
Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008), with special attention to the following issues.
Denote Yh as services ow from housing. Then the capital share p in private xed
capital (excluding consumer durables and residential structures) is computed as
p =
UCI   Yh +DEP
GNP  ACI   Yh
where UCI = rental income+net interest+corporate profit refers to unambiguous capital
income. DEP denotes consumption of xed capital. And ACI = proprietors0 income +
indirect business taxes:
Denote Ykp = p(GNP   Yh) as the income of physical capital (excluding consumer
durables) and Ysd as the service ows from consumer durables, which is computed following
Cooley and Prescott (1995). Then, the capital share in the output function  is computed
as
 =
Ykp + Ysd
GNP + Ysd   Yh
This gives a value 0.2732 for .
5.3 Algorithm
We solve the stationary equilibrium by the following steps:
1. Guess r and Tr:
2. Solve for the individual households decision rules by backward recursion.
3. Use forward recursion to compute the distribution ; and then compute the aggregate
K:
4. Use equations (12) and (13) to update r and Tr, respectively:
5. Iterate on r and Tr until convergence.
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5.4 Welfare Comparison
This section provides a comparison of the welfare e¤ects of eliminating social security in the
three economies: the economy with housing tenure, the benchmark economy and the one-
asset economy. To understand its di¤erence (or similarity) among these three economies, we
also decompose the overall welfare gain into several components according to the following
method.
5.4.1 Method of Welfare Decomposition
In our models, the potential channels by which eliminating social security a¤ects welfare
include the following: 1) General equilibrium e¤ects, that is, welfare e¤ects of eliminating so-
cial security arising from changes in equilibrium factor prices. 2) Intertemporal consumption
smoothing e¤ects. When households are credit-constrained, the payroll tax as mandatory
savings distorts the life-cycle consumption and saving behavior. 3) Imperfect annuity e¤ects.
Without private annuity markets, the annuity form of social security benets provides par-
tial insurance against mortality risks, leading to a reduction in precautionary savings and
accidental bequests. 4) Income risk sharing e¤ects. The nonlinear correlation between so-
cial security contributions and benets provides within-cohort redistribution among retirees,
thereby providing partial risk sharing against idiosyncratic income uncertainties. 5) Wealth
e¤ects. When the internal return on social security contributions, g + n, is not equivalent
to the market return on capital, r, eliminating social security will directly change lifetime
wealth, thereby a¤ecting the welfare of households.
To decompose the overall welfare e¤ect, we conduct several counterfactual experiments
similar to those in Storesletten et al. (1999), in which progressively fewer candidates are at
work.41 Specically, to isolate the general equilibrium e¤ects, we hold prices xed at their
initial steady state level and compute the associated compensating variations, denoted as
wp. The di¤erence of the welfare gain between this economy and the benchmark economy,
w0   wp; constitutes the magnitude of general equilibrium e¤ects. Next, to identify the in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing e¤ect, we extend the borrowing limit for all households
to a su¢ ciently large level so that essentially no households are borrowing constrained.42
The compensating variations in this economy is denoted as wi: The intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing e¤ect can then be measured as wp   wi: To compute the imperfect annuity
41 In Storesletten et al. (1999), the welfare decomposition does not involve the welfare gain from intertem-
poral consumption smoothing.
42Note that it is crucial to isolate the intertemporal consumption smoothing e¤ect before we shut down
income heterogeneity. This is because, as argued by Hubbard and Judd (1987), the marginal welfare loss
due to the borrowing constraints is convex in the tightness of the constraint. As a result, the welfare loss of
Social Security arising from distorting intertemporal consumption smoothing is underestimated in an economy
without within-cohort income heterogeneity.
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e¤ects of the PAYG system, we further allow perfect annuity markets and compute the re-
sulting compensating variations, denoted as wa. The imperfect annuity e¤ect is measured
as wi   wa: Finally, we shut down income uncertainty and compute the associated compen-
sating variations, denoted as wd. The di¤erence wa   wd measures the income risk sharing
e¤ects, and wd measures the welfare gain attributable to the wealth e¤ects.
5.4.2 Welfare Results
Table 12 summarizes the welfare results of eliminating social security for the three economies.
The top panel of this table reports the compensating variations under alternative exper-
iments, while the bottom panel reports our measures of the quantitative importance for
di¤erence channels. A comparison of the overall welfare e¤ects highlights two results: First,
the magnitude of compensating variations is similar between the benchmark economy and
the economy with housing tenure, despite the incorporation of housing markets frictions in
the latter. Second, this number is substantially larger for economies with housing than for
the one-asset economy.
Table 12: A Comparison of Welfare E¤ects of Eliminating Social Security
CV (%) w/ Tenure Benchmark One-Asset One-Asset (lower )
Welfare Gains
Overall Welfare E¤ects, w0 20.14 20.03 12.12 20.71
Partial Equilibrium, wp 7.24 7.64 2.95 8.11
No borrowing limit, wi 2.78 3.78 .9994 5.24
Perfect Annuity, wa 3.49 5.57 2.47 5.99
No Uncertainty, wd 9.01 9.02 6.85 9.72
Welfare Decomposition
General Equi. E¤ects, w0   wp 12.90 12.39 9.17 12.60
Con. Smoothing E¤ect, wp   wi 4.46 3.86 1.95 2.87
Imperfect Annuity E¤ects, wi   wa -0.71 -1.79 -1.47 -0.75
Inc. Risk Sharing E¤ects, wa   wd -5.52 -3.45 -4.38 -3.73
Wealth E¤ects, wd 9.01 9.02 6.85 9.72
The reason for the similarity of welfare gain between the two economies with housing
is as follows. In both economies, welfare gains arise mainly from two channels: the general
equilibrium e¤ect and the wealth e¤ect (see the bottom panel of Table 12). The rst depends
on the magnitude of changes in the factor prices, while the second depends on the gap between
nancial asset returns and the implicit returns of social security, (n+ g). Since the changes
in factor prices due to eliminating social security are very similar between the two economies,
the magnitude of the general equilibrium e¤ect is similar. Moreover, as we calibrate both
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economies to match the same targets, the initial rate of return for nancial assets are the
same, rendering the wealth e¤ect quantitatively similar between the two economies.43
We now explain what drives the much larger welfare gain of eliminating social security in
economies with housing than in the one-asset economy. For conciseness, we compare the wel-
fare e¤ects between the benchmark economy and the one-asset economy. Our decomposition
results indicate that the di¤erence of the overall welfare gains between the two economies
(8.02) arises mainly from three main channels: the general equilibrium e¤ect (3.22), the
intertemporal consumption smooth e¤ect (1.91) and the wealth e¤ect (2.17). Note that the
value of calibrated  is much smaller for the benchmark economy (0.9585) than the one-asset
economy (0.9852). In other words, households in the one-asset economy tend to be more pa-
tient than their counterparts in the benchmark economy. Accordingly, when social security is
eliminated, households in the one-asset economy increase savings more. This will result in a
larger fall in the interest rate and, thus, a larger loss of interest income. Moreover, the more
patience of households in the one-asset economy leads to less distortion of social security on
the life-cycle consumption prole. Finally, a higher  in the one-asset economy implies a
higher KY and, thus, a lower return for savings in the initial steady state. Consequently, the
welfare gain from the wealth e¤ect is smaller.
To check the quantitative e¤ect of the value of  for the welfare gain of eliminating
social security, we set the value of  in the one-asset economy to be the same as that in the
benchmark economy (0.9585), while keeping all other parameter values as before.44 As the
last column of Table 12 shows, with a lower ; the welfare gain of eliminating social security
increases tremendously and becomes similar in magnitude to that of the benchmark economy.
Moreover, the bottom panel indicates that the major sources of this increase in welfare gain
are the general equilibrium e¤ect (3.43) and the wealth e¤ect (2.87). This conrms that a
gap in the value of calibrated  is the key reason for the large di¤erence in the welfare gain
between the economies with housing and the one-asset economy.
43The two economies di¤er in the magnitudes of the intertemporal consumption smoothing e¤ect and the
income risk sharing e¤ect. Intuitively, in the economy with housing tenure, social security crowds out owner
occupied housing, a cheaper option for housing services, especially at young ages. Hence, the distortion
on intertemporal consumption smoothing is higher. On the other hand, housing transaction costs make
households locally more risk-averse. This leads to a larger e¤ect of social security on income risk sharing.
44The interest rate and the aggregate K
Y
ratio in the initial steady state now become 7.40 percent and 2.59,
respectively.
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